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IMPROVING IMPAIRED DRIVING INVESTIGATIONS 
Introduction 
Impaired driving investigations 
have evolved into one of the most 
procedurally complex police functions 
of the 1990's. Bysheervolumealone, 
drinking-driving offences constitute al-
most 40% of Provincial Court cases 
in B.C.1 Generally, impaired prosecu-
tions result in acquittals or plea reso-
lutions in which the accused pleads 
guilty under s. 144(a) Motor Vehicle 
Act to "Drive without due care and 
attention". 2 
As of November 1997, the convic-
tion rate in B.C. for impaired drivers 
was an abysmal 30%.3 The objective 
of this paper is to briefly review im-
paired driving investigations and 
measures police officers can take to 
increase the likelihood of convictions 
and/or guilty pleas. The main objec-
tive is to refresh police officers on how 
to gather, document and articulate 
impaired driving cases. 
Why Impaired Investigations Fail 
There is no single reason why im-
paired cases are failing in court. The 
"loopholes" that are fatal to impaired 
cases are as numerous as there are 
defence counsel. Some of the most 
popular impaired driving "defences" 
are that there were insufficient rea-
sonable and probable grounds to read 
the breath demand, "evidence to the 
Tl/IS /SSC L 
Improving Impaired Driving ............. I 
Investigating Hate/Bias Crimes ........ 3 
Vehicle Searches .............................. 7 
Operational Notes ............................ 8 
Cst. Ed llli, Saanich Police Department 
contrary" defence, "recent drink" de-
fence, Approved Screening Device 
("ASD") difficulties and "arbitrary arrest 
and detention" issues. 
Most Crown and defence counsel 
agree that impaired driving cases are 
usually "made" or "broken" at the criti-
cal reasonable and probable grounds 
stage of the investigation. While most 
diligent police officers usually have rea-
sonable and probable grounds to read 
the breath demand, experience has 
revealed that they generally make in-
sufficient notes of the grounds, write 
non-descriptor generic reports to Crown 
counsel without detailing their grounds 
or fail to articulate fully the evidence/ 
grounds when testifying in court. Of-
ficers generally give their evidence-in-
chief very well, however, cases some-
times unravel during cross-examination 
by defence counsel. 
At the Justice Institute of B.C., Po-
lice Academy, Judge K. Libby of the 
Provincial Court occasionally attends 
as a guest speaker. Judge Libby has 
observed that officers need to articu-
late "in great detail" what they observed. 
For example, the usual evidence of 
''weaving in the laneway'' should be that 
"the accused's vehicle slowly crossed 
the double yellow line two metres into 
the oncoming lane of traffic, then sud-
denly swerved right across the white 
shoulder line by two feet."4 Judge 
Higinbotham concurs, commenting in 
R. v. Froese that, " .. .I wish more offic-
ers would take the time to pay so close 
attention to detail as was in this 
case ... "5 Judge K. Bracken agrees, 
noting that with solid observations that 
are well documented and profession-
ally articulated in court, the Crown will 
have a much better chance of obtain-
ing a conviction.6 
Similarly, in speaking with Crown 
counsel, the author has learned that 
the main difficulty in prosecuting im-
paired driving cases is the lack of de-
tail when officers give viva voce evi-
dence in court. Further problems arise 
during cross-examination when offic-
ers hesitate or appear unsure of their 
answers. To counteract these short-
comings, officers need to be very clear 
on their observations, their legal 
grounds for demanding a breath sam-
ple and confidently justify their actions. 
Investigative Considerations 
It is apparent then that officers must 
firstly observe and record in detail the 
driving pattern of suspected impaired 
drivers (e.g. vehicle was paced at 65 
kmh in the 50 kmh zone, slowly 
crossed the double solid yellow lines 
into the oncoming lane of traffic by one 
metre, it then gradually moved back 
right at 60 kmh, with the passenger 
side wheels crossing the white shoul-
der line for 100 metres). 
Secondly, it is also important to 
observe and record other indicia of in-
toxication and impairment as you ap-
proach the vehicle. It is important to 
note the driver was occupying the driv-
er's seat (i.e. care and control of the 
vehicle), the manner in which the win-
dow is opened and how the driver 
reached for his or her licence (e.g. 
driver fumbles with the wallet, passes 
by the licence, and produces a credit 
card). 
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While the driver is obtaining his or 
her documents, determine if there is 
the odour of liquor emanating directly 
from the driver's breath as he or she 
speaks. If the driver asks questions 
or makes comments, the smell should 
be pronounced and obvious. Continue 
by observing the driver's face, in par-
ticular the eyes, lips and cheeks. The 
white conjunctiva of the eyes may have 
a pronounced red or bloodshot appear-
ance. Observe the response of the 
driver's eyelids when the flashlight 
beam crosses her or his face. If the 
eyelids close or respond slower than 
is usually the case with a sober per-
son, it is a significant piece of evi-
dence. The lips generally will be dry 
(due to alcohol molecules bonding with 
the body's water molecules), conse-
quently the lips and mouth become 
drier in relation to the amount of liquor 
consumed. While the driver's speech 
may be "slurred", it is crucial to de-
scribe what the "slurring" sounded like 
(e.g. was the driver slow to articulate 
the words, appeared tongue tied, could 
not speak clearly, appeared to mum-
ble). Evidence of alcohol consumption 
(e.g. admission or open beer cans in 
backseat) and indicators of intoxica-
tion are important to note and record 
as the investigator begins to formulate 
the opinion that the driver's ability to 
operate a motor vehicle is impaired by 
alcohol. 
Where sufficient grounds to make 
a breath demand are not present, the 
next logical step may be to conduct 
sobriety or balance tests. Even though 
evidence from roadside sobriety tests 
are admissible as evidence (e.g. pick-
ing coins up off the pavement or index 
finger to nose), the best form of sobri-
ety tests are those based on natural 
or normal movements for most people. 
Consequently, it would be prudent to 
ask the driver to exit the vehide. While 
exiting the vehicle the driver is provid-
ing the investigator with more obser-
vation evidence. In particular, take 
note of whether the driver fumbles for 
the door handle, tries to step out of 
the vehicle with the seatbelt still on, 
"pulls" himself or herself up by the door, 
leans against the vehicle for support, 
is unsteady on her or his feet, has 
wobbly knees, and has dishevelled 
clothing (e.g. food stains on front of 
shirt). Do confirm the smell of liquor 
emanating from the driver's breath. 
Next, normal practice is to have the 
driver walk to the sidewalk for safety 
reasons, paying close attention to the 
driver's balance, stride and coordina-
tion. If an opinion has not already been 
formed, once at the sidewalk, the in-
vestigator may have become convinced 
that the driver is impaired. 
The ASD is another tool an officer 
can use to form reasonable grounds 
during a drinking-driving investigation. 
However, as with any piece of equip-
ment and technology, its accuracy and 
precision will often be vigorously chal-
lenged in court. ASDs were initially 
used to supplement or form an offic-
er's reasonable grounds during the field 
sobriety test phase of the investigation. 
In many instances, ASDs have cre-
ated numerous technological and ad-
ministrative issues that can hinder im-
paired driving investigations. For ex-
ample, defence counsel frequently in-
quire as to when the instrument was 
last calibrated, who calibrated it, and 
demand disclosure of maintenance 
and operational logs. In fact, the au-
thor has been generally advised by 
Crown counsel that "If you are dealing 
with an impaired driver, based on your 
observations, symptoms and odour of 
liquor, do not use the ASD."7 By intro-
ducing the ASD unnecessarily, the in-
vestigator can open up more avenues 
for defence counsel to pursue at trial. 
There are times, however, when the 
ASD is appropriate. In particular, when 
a driver displays borderline symptoms 
of impairment, is moderately impaired 
or the signs and symptoms of intoxi-
cation are not obvious. Further, ASDs 
are frequently used during Counter At-
tack Roadchecks where very little driv-
ing evidence is available. If an ASD is 
used, make sure the log is up to date 
and photocopy the calibration sheet to 
prove the ASD was valid when the test 
was conducted. 
At this point, if the opinion has been 
formed that the driver is impaired, the 
investigator should read or cite the s. 
10 Charter (i.e. right to counsel) and 
police warnings. From this point on, it 
is imperative that the investigator holds 
the opinion that the driver's ability to 
operate a motor vehicle is impaired by 
alcohol. 
If necessary, the driver can bear-
rested under s. 253 of the Criminal 
Code for impaired operation of a motor 
vehicle. Impaired driving is a dual pro-
cedure offence which the driver has 
been found committing. Pursuant to 
the Interpretation Act, 8 all dual proce-
dure offences are deemed to be indict-
able until such time as the Crown 
elects to proceed by indictment or 
summary conviction. Consequently, 
there is the power to arrest pursuant 
to s. 495(1) of the CC. 
The next step is the breath demand. 
Read the breath demand from the de-
partment issued card, and if necessary, 
explain the demand in lay terms to fa-
cilitate the driver's understanding. 
Notes of any verbatim conversation are 
important. By this point in the investi-
gation, it should be very clear to the 
driver that he or she is under arrest or 
detention, and under the statutory ob-
ligation to accompany the officer to 
provide a breath sample. 
Once at the police office, under the 
Charter if the driver wants to speak to 
counsel this should occur without de-
lay. This process provides a further 
opportunity to gather evidence. For 
example, observe and record the dex-
terity and coordination of the driver 
making the phone call. Observe how 
the driver uses the phone book, han-
dies the receiver and hunts for the num-
bers on the phone. If the driver falls 
asleep, vomits or falls over, this is fur-
ther evidence of alcohol consumption 
and impairment. It is important to re-
member that the driver has a right to 
privacy once contact is made with a 
lawyer. Note the start and end time of 
consultation with counsel. 
The investigating officer must con-
duct a pre-BT A observation period of 
15 minutes. This time should be used 
to make further direct, face-to-face ob-
servations of the driver. Any burps, 
belches, vomiting or anything put in 
the mouth should be noted. During 
this time, the "prisoner sheet" and/or 
impaired investigation guide should be 
completed, and if possible, a brief dia-
logue with the driver should occur. This 
questioning should eliminate the "re-
cent drink" defence or the "evidence 
to the contrary" defence. Keep in mind 
that detailed notes will assist the in-
vestigation and help during the ''voir 
dire" at trial. 
According to Crown, it is important 
that the investigating officer introduce 
the driver to the BT A technician and 
briefly explain the circumstances to 
the technician. This allows the tech-
nician to have the reasonable grounds 
to obtain suitable samples from the 
driver. This procedure is also impor-
tant in case the driver refuses to sup-
ply breath samples. In the event of a 
refusal to provide a breath sample, 
careful notes by the technician are cru-
cial, particularly the verbatim words or 
refusal actions of the driver. 
Conclusion 
This article was compiled to give 
officers insight into some of the prob-
lems that can arise during impaired 
investigations and court proceedings. 
Hopefully, by making detailed obser-
vations of impaired drivers and fully 
documenting these observations, the 
number of guilty pleas and convictions 
will improve in this area. 
Endnotes: 
1
· This pecentage estimate is based on verbal 
responses from Crown Counsel the author in-
formally surveyed during 1997. 
2
· R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 318. 
3
· This percentage estimate is based on the 
response of a Supreme Court Crown Counsel 
the author interviewed in November 1997. 
4
· These observations were made by Judge 
Libby during presentations at the JIBC, Police 
Academy in 1990-91. 
5
· This comment occurred at the conclusion of 
R. v. Froese (B.C. Prov. Ct.) (Saanich) in which 
the accused was found guilty of impaired driv-
ing by drug. 
6
· These observations were made during an 
interview of Judge Bracken while the author 
was conducting research on this topic. 
7
· Personal correspondence with a B.C. Su-
preme Court Crown Counsel in November, 1997. 
6
· R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21 . 
A CRIME AS OLD AS HUMANITY: 
INVESTIGATING HATE/BIAS CRIMES 
Introduction 
Hate/bias crimes are not 
historically or geographically isolated 
events of no consequence to the police 
or citizens of British Columbia. Ethnic 
cleansing in former Yugoslavia, neo-
Nazi skinhead attacks on immigrants 
in Europe, the bombing of the World 
Trade Centre in New York and the 
mass murder of women students by 
Mark Lepine in Montreal are all vivid 
Craig S. MacMiiian, RCMP 
Rick McKenna, Vancouver Police 
Provincial Hate Crime Team 
examples of modern day hate/bias 
crimes. Since time immemorial, 
individuals or groups have been 
discriminated against and assailed 
because of personal characteristics 
such as colour, religion, ethnicity or 
disability. The fact that certain 
individuals are driven to commit crimes 
against others because of hatred, bias 
or prejudice based on colour, ethnic 
origin, religion, sexual orientation or 
gender is well documented. The exact 
scope and extent of hate/bias crime in 
British Columbia (or Canada for that 
matter) is, however, not well known. 
The purpose of this article is to 
briefly outline the recent initiatives in 
British Columbia to deal with hate/bias 
crime, the various roles and 
responsibilities and review the 
3 
legislative provisions and judicial 
decisions that regulate hate/bias 
crimes. 
Background 
UntU recently, the police in British 
Columbia did not accurately or 
consistently record, document or track 
hate/bias related crimes. While it 
cannot be stated conclusively whether 
hate/bias crimes are increasing, there 
are a number of assaults, damage to 
property (e.g. spray painting religious 
centres, homes or vehicles with racial 
or religious symbols/epiths) and hate 
propaganda incidents reported to the 
police in British Columbia every year. 
For example, Vancouver Police 
Department, the first police agency in 
British Columbia to start gathering 
hate/bias data in 1991, 1 recorded 992 
and 101 3 hate/bias offences, 
respectively, in 1996 and 1997. Based 
on the number of hate/bias crimes 
"reported" to police, gay males are the 
most victimized group in Vancouver 
(approximately 30% of reported 
incidents relate to sexual orientation). 
Further, while organized hate groups 
are usually identified as the major 
cause of concern with respect to hate/ 
bias crime, recent data from Ontario 
suggests that only 5% of hate/bias 
crimes are committed by organized 
hate groups.4 This means that 95% 
of hate/bias crimes are committed by 
individuals that have no connection to 
organized hate groups. Only time will 
tell if the same holds true in British 
Columbia, however, police officers 
must be cognizant of the fact that 
hate/bias crimes are not restricted to 
known and visible hate groups. 
It is also important to understand 
that there are a number features of 
hate/bias crime that set it apart from 
most other criminal offences. One of 
the most unique features of hate/bias 
crime is the extreme traumatization 
experienced by the victim. For 
example, unlike members of the public 
who can take steps to protect 
themselves and their property from 
criminal acts (e.g. alarms, dead bolts), 
individuals attacked because of the 
colour of their skin cannot do anything 
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to change such innate features to 
prevent racist attacks. It should also 
not be overlooked that hate/bias 
offences are meant to target the widest 
audience possible and to increase the 
sense of vulnerability of the individual/ 
group targeted (e.g. spray painting a 
synagogue). Groups and individuals 
targeted in hate/bias crimes feel 
devalued, diminished and betrayed by 
society. There is also a tendency for 
hate/bias attacks to be more vicious 
and severe. 
Roles and Responsibilities 
In response to growing concern over 
hate/bias crimes in British Columbia, 
the Attorney General created the 
Provincial Hate Crime Team ("HCT") in 
1996. The HCT is comprised of 
representatives from the Ministry of the 
Attorney General (Criminal Justice 
Branch, Policy and Communications, 
Police Services Branch and 
Multiculturalism B.C.), Vancouver 
Police Department and the RCMP. The 
mandate of the HCT is to ensure the 
effective identification, investigation 
and prosecution of crimes motivated 
(in whole or in part) by hate, bias or 
prejudice. 
The HCT has undertaken several 
initiatives to ensure that hate/bias 
crimes are better identified, 
investigated and prosecuted. First, the 
HCT has adopted a working definition 
of hate/bias crime based on the recent 
amendments to the Criminal Code 
("CCjcontained ins. 718.2: 
A hate/bias crime is a criminal 
offence committed against a 
person .or property which is 
motivated by the suspect's hate, 
prejudice or bias against an 
identifiable group based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, language, 
colour, religion, sex, age, mental 
or physical disability, sexual 
orientation or any other similar 
factor. 
Second, the HCT widely consulted 
with police agencies, as well as 
numerous public, private and 
community agencies, organizations 
and individuals on proposed policy to 
guide the police and Crown counsel 
in their response to hate/bias crimes. 
In June 1997, the Attorney General 
issued the Hate/Bias Crime Policy 
Guide5 (the "Policy'') which outlines the 
roles and responsibilities of the police 
and Crown counsel when dealing with 
hate/bias incidents. 
In relation to all incidents or 
reported incidents of hate/bias crime, 
the Policy directs the police to attend 
(e.g. hate/bias damage to property 
reports previously completed over the 
phone will now require police 
attendance), fully investigate (i.e. 
seize evidence or samples, take 
statements and photographs), 
thoroughly document(i.e. identify and 
highlight evidence or indicators of hate/ 
bias in police and Crown counsel 
reports), properly categorize/score 
files, conduct follow-up (i.e. victim 
services or community concerns) and 
forward copies of any reports to the 
HCT. 6 Community groups and 
individuals who deal with hate/bias 
matters are fully aware of the Policy 
and the responsibilities it places on 
the police. Copies of the Policy have 
been widely distributed to all police 
agencies.7 
In relation to Crown counsel, the 
Policy notes that in almost all cases 
the "public interest" favours the 
prosecution of hate/bias crimes. 
Further, where there is a substantial 
likelihood of conviction, hate/bias 
crimes are to be fully prosecuted with 
evidence of hate/bias being presented 
to the court during bail hearings and 
sentencing. The Policy also directs 
Crown that "hate-motivated offences 
should generally be considered 
inappropriate" for alternative measures 
and individual victims are to be fully 
consulted and informed.8 
Third, in 1997, two operational 
police officers (one from Vancouver 
Police Department and one from the 
RCMP) were appointed to the HCT and 
opened an office in Vancouver. The 
HCT police members' duties include 
assisting local agencies with hate/bias 
crime investigations, compiling a data 
base of hate/bias crimes (hence the 
requirement for police agencies to 
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forward reports of hate/bias incidents 
to the HCT), develop and deliver 
training for police personnel (i.e. a 
three hour training session is being 
provided to operational officers, 
telecommunications operators, 
complaint-takers, victims services staff 
and media relations designates 
throughout the Province), participate in 
education and prevention programs, 
liaise with community groups, 
Multiculturalism B.C., human rights 
commissions, and work with other 
international, federal and provincial 
agencies to address hate/bias crime 
issues. Tracking reported hate/bias 
incidents through the reporting, 
investigation, charge, trial and 
sentencing stages will be an integral 
function of the HCT police members' 
duties. 
Statutory Provisions and Case Law 
Hate/bias provisions of the CC can 
be separated into two categories. 
First, hate/bias propaganda offences 
where an individual advocates genocide 
(s. 318) or publicly incites/promotes 
hatred (s. 319) against an identifiable 
group. Second, any other criminal 
offence (e.g. "gay bashing") motivated 
by hate, bias or prejudice against an . 
identifiable group where the judge must 
consider this as an aggravating factor 
at sentencing (s. 718.2(a)(i)). 
Pursuant to s. 318 of the CC, 
anyone who advocates or promotes 
genocide is guilty of an indictable 
offence. "Genocide" occurs where an 
individual with "intent to destroy in 
whole or in part any identifiable group" 
(a) kills members of the group, or (b) 
deliberately inflicts on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction. 
"Identifiable group" is defined as "any 
section of the public distinguished by 
colour, race, religion or ethnic origin." 
The current statutory definition of 
identifiable group does not include 
language, sex, age, mental or physical 
disability or sexual orientation. These 
provisions were enacted in the 1970s, 
and as result, there is a clear need to 
amend the definition of identifiable 
group to ensure vulnerable groups are 
protected. 
In relation to hate propaganda, 
there are two possible hate/bias 
offences unders. 319ofthe CC. First, 
under subsection (1) anyone who by 
communicating statements in any 
public place, incites hatred against 
any identifiable group where such 
incitement is likely to lead to a breach 
of the peace is guilty of a dual 
procedure offence. Second, under 
subsection, (2) anyone who by 
communicating statements, other 
than in a private conversation, wilfully 
promotes hatred against an identifiable 
group is guilty of a dual procedure 
offence. For the purposes of both 
offences, subsection (7) states that 
"identifiable group" has the same 
meaning as set out ins. 318. Further, 
"communicating" includes by 
telephone, broadcasting or other 
audible or visible means. "Public 
place" includes any place to which the 
public have access as of right or by 
invitation, express or implied. 
"Statements" includes words spoken 
or written or recorded electronically 
or electro-magnetically or otherwise, 
and gestures, signs or other visible 
representations. 
At present, any individual or group 
that advocates genocide, publicly 
incites hatred or wilfully promotes 
hatred on the basis of language, sex, 
age, mental or physical disability or 
sexual orientation is not committing 
a criminal offence. The HCT has 
encountered instances where 
literature has been distributed by 
known individuals that potentially 
constituted the promotion of hatred 
against gays and lesbians, but 
because sexual orientation is not 
covered, no enforcement action could 
be instituted. In such cases, 
investigators/complaints should 
contact the B.C. Human Rights 
Commission which has jurisdiction to 
deal with signs, symbols or literature 
that promotes hatred or contempt 
based on the grounds not currently 
covered under the CC. 
It should be noted also that 
subsection (3) provides several 
statutory defences to wilfully promoting 
hatred. No person shall be convicted 
for wilfully promoting hatred under 
subsection (2) if (a) the statements 
were true, (b) in good faith, the person 
expressed or attempted to establish by 
argument an opinion on a religious 
subject, (c) the statements were 
relevant to any subject of public interest, 
the discussion of which was for public 
benefit, and if on reasonable grounds 
the person believed them to be true, or 
(d) in good faith, the person intended 
to point out, for the purposes of removal, 
matters producing or tending to 
produce feelings of hatred toward an 
identifiable group in Canada. 
Several of the terms contained in 
subsection (2) have also been the 
subject of judicial interpretation. First, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal held in R. 
v. Buzzanga that the mental element 
of "wilfully" is satisfied only where an 
accused subjectively desires the 
promotion of hatred or foresees such a 
consequence as certain or 
substantially certain to result from the 
act. 9 The Crown can prove intent either 
from circumstantial evidence (e.g. mass 
distribution) or by direct evidence (e.g. 
verbal statements of intent or 
subsequent admissions). 
In R. v. Keegstra, 10 the Supreme 
Court of Canada took the opportunity 
to define two other terms relative to s. 
319(2). In relation to "promotes", the 
Court found it indicates more than 
simple encouragement or 
advancement, it means the active 
support or instigation of hatred. For 
example, the physical action of 
distributing hate material constitutes 
the actus reus of the offence and the 
content of the material and actions of 
an accused can lead to inferences 
about promotion of hatred. 
The Supreme Court of Canada 
adopted a high threshold for "hatred" in 
Keegstra. The Court stated that hatred 
does not denote a wide range of diverse 
emotions, but covers only the most 
intense form of dislike, enmity, 
vilification, detestation or opprobrium. 
Hatred is the most extreme emotion 
that belies reason, it is predicated on 
destruction, thrives on insensitivity and 
5 
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bigotry. Hatred is an emotion that 
implies individuals are to be despised, 
scorned, detested, denied respect and 
made the subject of ill-treatment on 
the basis of group affiliation. 11 It is 
evident that a considerable amount of 
offensive or intolerant remarks, 
symbols, signs or literature against 
identifiable groups is probably not 
captured by the Supreme Court of 
Canada's conception of hatred (e.g. 
picture of a Swastika). 
The second CC measure that deals 
with hate/bias crimes is the sentence 
enhancement provisions of s. 716.2. 
In 1996, the CC was amended to 
direct judges to take into 
consideration as an aggravating factor 
evidence that the offence was 
motivated by hate, bias or prejudice 
based on race, national or ethnic 
origin, language, colour, religion, sex, 
age, mental or physical disability, 
sexual orientation or any other similar 
factor. In other words, if there is 
evidence that an assault, damage to 
property, threatening, or harassment 
offence was motivated by hate, bias 
or prejudice, it is an aggravating factor 
for the purposes of sentencing (i.e. it 
should result in a more severe 
sanction). This highlights the critical 
role of police investigators in securing 
and recording evidence of hate, bias 
or prejudice in reports to Crown 
counsel. Unlike the propaganda 
provisions/offences, s. 716.2 is much 
broader in its definition of identifiable 
group and it includes bias and 
prejudice in addition to hatred. 
Codifying in the CC hate, bias or 
prejudice as an aggravating factor in 
sentencing builds on a body of cases 
which established that criminal 
offences motivated by hate/bias will 
result in increased sentences. For 
example, in R. v. Ingram and 
Grimsdafe12 the court doubled the 
length of sentences of two males that 
viciously assaulted a person of colour 
because of their racial bias. In 
considering the principles of 
sentencing, courts have confirmed that 
attacks against a person on the basis 
of perceived sexuality, damage to 
synagogue or to a Sikh temple due 
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to hate or prejudice can lead to an 
increased sentence. 13 By simply 
reporting indicators/evidence of hate/ 
bias motivation in reports to Crown 
counsel, investigators can greatly 
assist the courts in coming to a proper 
sentence for such offences. 
In incidents where hate/bias is 
present, but there is no criminal offence 
(e.g. discrimination based on race, 
colour, ancestry, place of origin, 
religion, marital status, family status, 
physical or mental disability, sex, 
sexual orientation or age in the context 
of employment, residential tenancy, the 
use of public facilities or by statements, 
signs or symbols that are likely to 
expose a person to hatred or contempt), 
the complainant can be referred to the 
appropriate human rights commission. 
It is also appropriate to refer 
complainants to a lawyer if they have 
been the subject of hate/bias activity 
in order to ensure they receive legal 
advice about any possible civil actions 
(e.g. assault and battery, intentional 
infliction of mental suffering) or remedy 
under the Civil Rights Protection Act. 14 
Conclusion 
The police have an integral role in 
ending hate crime in British Columbia. 
Although legislative changes are 
required in relation to hate propaganda 
offences, the recent amendments to the 
CC making hate/bias an aggravating 
factor at the time of sentencing provide 
a powerful tool for investigators to 
ensure appropriate sanctions. If police 
departments or investigators have any 
questions or concerns in relation to 
hate/bias crime, please contact the 
authors at (604) 660-2659 or 660-2617. 
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ening, 5 threatening phone calls, 2 harassing 
phone calls, 7 threatening letter, 29 hate litera-
ture. 
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· The 101 hate/bias offences reported to 
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assaults, 9 mischief, 12 robbery, 2 extortion, 2 
B&E, 4 threatening, 2 threatening letter, 9 threat-
ening phone calls, 2 harassing phone calls, 8 
harassing letters, 3 hate literature, 2 criminal 
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4
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tario by Standards and New Programs 
Branch, Policing Services Division, Ministry 
of the Solicitor General and Correctional Serv-
ices, Hate Crime: Writing On The Wall - A 
Guide for Police Officers. 
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· British Columbia, Attorney General and 
Minister Responsible for Multiculturalism, Hu-
man Rights and Immigration, End Hate Crime 
- Hate/Bias Crime Police Guide (Revised 
January, 1998). 
e. Ibid. at 7-8. 
1
· The RCMP and Vancouver Police Depart-
ment have also amended their respective poli-
cies to incorporate the Policy obligations. 
a. Supra, note 5 at 11-14. 
9
· 49 C.C.C. (2d) 369 (Ont. C.A.) at 385 (ap-
proved in Keegstra, infra.). 
10-(1990), 61 c.c.c. (3d) 1. 
11. Ibid. at 59-60. 
12. (19n). 35 c.c.c. (2d) 376 (Ont. C.A.). 
13. For example, see, R. v. Atkinson, Ing and 
Roberts (1978), 43 C.C.C. (2d) 342 (Ont. 
C.A.), R. v. Le/as (1990), 58 C.C.C. (3d) 568 
(Ont. C.A.), R. v. J.H. and S.G. (1995) 100 
Mile House Reg. #498 (Prov. Youth Ct.). 
14 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 49, s. 1(1) makes it a 
"prohibited acr to engage in any conduct or 
communication interfering with the civil rights 
of a person or class of persons by promoting 
hatred or contempt, superiority or inferiority, 
based on colour, race, religion, ethnic origin 
or place of origin. While s. 4(1) makes it a 
summary conviction offence to engage in a 
prohibited act, unless legal advice or direc-
tion Is obtained from the HCT otherwise, po-
lice officers are not to make any arrests un-
der this Act. 
Hate Crime 
VEHICLE SEARCHES IN THE WAKE OF CASLAKE 
Introduction 
In the last Issues of Interest, an 
article was written regarding 
warrantless vehicle searches. 1 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of 
Canada ("SCC") had more to say on 
the topic of vehicle searches, and did 
so in the case of R. v. Caslake2. The 
purpose of this article is to briefly 
outline, in the wake of Caslake, the 
state of the law as it relates to vehicle 
searches and searches incident to 
arrest. Caslake provides some further 
important direction regarding a number 
of principles surrounding searches. 
Facts 
A conservation officer observed 
Caslake's car by the side of highway, 
and noted Caslake standing in tall 
grass about 30 feet away. The 
conservation officer, concerned about 
illegal hunting, questioned Caslake, 
who stated he was relieving himself. 
Caslake returned to his vehicle and 
departed. The conservation officer 
returned to the grassy area and found 
a garbage bag containing nine pounds 
of marihuana wrapped in cellophane. 
The conservation officer seized the bag, 
called for RCMP assistance, pursued 
Caslake and arrested him for 
possession of drugs. Within a few 
minutes, an RCMP officer arrived, took 
custody of Caslake, transported him 
to the detachment and had the 
suspect vehicle towed to a garage. Six 
hours later, the RCMP officer attended 
the garage, and without a warrant or 
Caslake's consent/permission, 
searched the vehicle and located 
$1,400.00 cash and two packages 
each containing approximately a 1/4 
ounce of cocaine. At trial, the RCMP 
officer testified that the sole reason for 
conducting the vehicle search was to 
comply with policy to safeguard 
valuables and record the condition of 
the vehicle. 
The issue before the SCC was 
whether the officer had conducted an 
unreasonable search under s. 8 of the 
Charter, and if so, whether the evidence 
Craig S. MacMillan 
located as a result of the search 
should be excluded under s. 24(2) of 
the Charter. 
Reasonable Search 
In Hunter 3 the SCC held thats. 8 
of the Charter only protects an 
individual's reasonable expectation of 
privacy, and that reasonableness is 
determined by balancing the 
individual's privacy interest against the 
interest of the state in effective law 
enforcement. In order for a search to 
be reasonable under s. 8 it must be 
( 1) authorized by law, (2) the law itself 
must be reasonable, and (3) the 
manner in which the search is 
conducted must be reasonable. 4 
While the accused normally has the 
obligation to prove a Charter breach, 
the sec has consistently ruled that a 
warrantless search is prima facie 
unreasonable, which means the Crown 
has the obligation to establish, on a 
balance of probabilities, that such a 
search is reasonable. 
Authorized by Law 
The majority noted that a search 
can fail to be authorized by law where 
( 1 ) the state authority conducting the 
search cannot point to a specific (a) 
statutory or (b) common law rule 
authorizing the search, (2) the search 
is not conducted in accordance with 
the (a) procedural and (b) substantive 
requirements of the authorizing law 
(e.g. no reasonable grounds in 
Information to obtain warrant), and (3) 
the scope of the search is not limited 
to the (a) area and (b) to those items 
for which the law has granted the 
search authority. If any search 
exceeds these requirements, it is not 
authorized by law and is unreasonable. 
Incident to Arrest 
Based on the facts of this case, 
the only legal authority upon which the 
Crown could assert that the vehicle 
search was conducted is the common 
law power to search incident to arrest. 
The majority noted that in Cloutief' it 
was ruled that the right to search 
incident to arrest arises from the fact 
of the arrest, and therefore, it is not 
necessary for the officer to have further 
or independent reasonable grounds 
apart from the arrest to conduct the 
search (because the arrest was 
effected on reasonable grounds). Thus, 
the legality of the search derives from 
the legality of the arrest. If the arrest 
was unlawful or arbitrary the search 
incident to arrest will also be invalid.6 
The power to search incident to 
arrest (1) does not impose a duty to 
search (i.e. if the law can be effectively 
and safely applied without a search the 
police have the discretion not to 
conduct a search), (2) it must be for a 
valid objective in pursuit of the ends of 
criminal justice (i.e. discovery of an 
object or item that may (a) pose a 
threat to the safety of the police, 
accused or public, (b) facilitate escape, 
or (c) provide evidence against the 
accused), and (3) the search must not 
be conducted in an abusive fashion (i.e. 
use of physical or psychological 
constraint must be proportionate to the 
objectives sought and other 
circumstances of the situation ).7 If the 
arrest is lawful and these three 
conditions are met the search incident 
to arrest is authorized by law under s. 
8 of the Charter. 
The scope of the power to search 
incident to arrest can refer to several 
factors including the items seized, the 
place searched and temporal limits. 
The majority made several 
observations of note. First, since 
vehicles do not attract a heightened 
expectation of privacy, they can 
legitimately be the objects of search 
incident to arrest. Second, courts 
should be reluctant to set a strict time 
limit on the amount of time that can 
elapse between the time of the arrest 
and the time of the search. 
However, the majority noted that a 
search must be truly incidental to the 
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arrest. In other words, the police must 
be attempting to achieve some valid 
purpose/objective connected to the 
arrest when conducting the search 
incident to arrest. In order to determine 
whether a valid objective existed, the 
majority accepts that there must be 
toth a subjective and objective 
evaluation of the search. Thus, at the 
time of the search incident to arrest, 
the officer must subjectively have in 
mind the purpose of the search and it 
must be objectively reasonable (i.e. 
would a reasonably informed person 
conclude that the objective/purpose 
existed for the search). This is where 
the minority (three) disagreed with the 
majority. The minority asserts that the 
officer does not have to subjectively 
turn his or her mind to the exact 
purpose of the search. In the 
minority's view, the majority, after 
purportedly rejecting the requirement 
of independent reasonable grounds to 
search incident to arrest, has indirectly 
adopted a reasonable grounds 
threshold for searches incident to 
arrest by requiring subjective grounds. 
The minority asserts that the intention 
of the officer is irrelevant when a search 
is conducted incident to arrest. 
The Result 
In this case, even though 
objectively the officer could have validly 
searched the vehicle incident to arrest 
to find further evidence (i.e. objective 
purpose), the officer testified that his 
sole reason for searching the vehicle 
was to comply with RCMP inventory 
policy (i.e. subjective purpose), which 
was not a legitimate incident to arrest 
purpose and the search was 
unreasonable contrary to s. 8. The 
minority held that the officer's 
subjective intent was irrelevant and the 
search was valid as incident to arrest. 
In this case, because of the operational 
realities at the detachment (i.e. limited 
personnel and other duties of the 
RCMP officer), the Court did not object 
to the six hour delay before the search 
was conducted of the vehicle. 
Under the Collins Test,8 since the 
evidence in this case was not 
conscriptive (i.e. it did not affect trial 
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fairness), the breach was not serious 
(i.e. the search was not obtrusive, there 
was no evidence of damage or harm 
to the vehicle, there is a lesser 
expectation of privacy in a vehicle than 
in one's home, office or person, there 
were objective grounds to search, and 
the officer acted in good faith reliance 
on RCMP policy), and the disrepute 
to justice would be greater by not 
admitting the evidence (i.e. 
seriousness of offence and importance 
of evidence to case), the majority did 
not exdude the evidence located in the 
vehicle. Since the minority found there 
was no violation, it would have 
dismissed the appeal. 
Conclusion 
There are important features that 
arise from this case in relation to 
searches. First, it is possible to 
search a vehicle, without a warrant, 
incident to arrest. In circumstances 
where investigators have prior 
knowledge of evidence being located 
in a vehicle, it is probably safest to 
obtain a warrant or consent before 
searching. Second, police officers 
must specifically/subjectively consider 
the reason they are searching a vehicle 
(person or immediate surroundings) 
incident to arrest (i.e. for weapons or 
evidence related to offence). Hopefully 
this brief overview of Caslake has 
helped to clarify the principles 
surrounding vehicle and incident to 
arrest searches. . 
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OPERATIONAL 
NOTES 
Beckstead v. Ottawa (City) (22 Dec. 
1997) (Ont C.A.) 
On appeal, the Court upheld an award 
of $20,000 for negligence, finding that 
a police officer acted with indifference 
to the consequences of laying a charge 
and the investigation fell short of even 
the basic steps which might have been 
taken to establish grounds. 
R. v. White(B.C.C.A.) 
The Appeal court has ruled that 
accident reports required by the 
provincial Motor Vehicle Act are 
inadmissible and cannot be used in 
subsequent criminal proceedings. 
Drivers involved in certain types of 
accidents have a statutory obligation 
to make a report to the police. It is a 
summary offence to fail to make a 
report. The MVA states accident reports 
cannot be used in subsequent charges 
under the MVA. However, there is no 
statutory restriction on the use of 
accident reports in criminal 
proceedings. To allow the use of the 
statutorily compelled statements would 
violate the right against self-
incrimination and such reports must be 
excluded from evidence. 
R. v. Connors(B.C.C.A.) 
In three sets of separate reasons the 
BCCA overruled the trial court and 
admitted fingerprint evidence obtained 
from the accused before he was formally 
charged. All three justices agreed that 
on the evidence, the accused 
consented to being fingerprinted after 
his arrest. One justice, however, went 
further and found that "charged" is not 
a term of art and applies to any subject 
lawfully arrested. He also found there 
is a common law authority to fingerprint 
after arrest. The other two justices 
disagreed on both points, noting that 
the police can avoid the "charged" 
problem by simply issuing a~ 
Appearance Notice to the suspect 
requiring fingerprinting five minutes later. 
